THE
ALAWI COMMUNITY AND THE SYRIA CRISIS
“ALAWIS to the grave and CHRISTIANS
to BEIRUT!” This troubling slogan was chanted during demonstrations against the
ASSAD regime in spring 2011, and exactly who was behind the chanting remains a
controversial question. The SYRIAN opposition claimed that the slogan’s authors
were members of the intelligence services who had infiltrated the
demonstrations. According to this view, SYRIAN government agents were seeking
to portray the opposition as primarily motivated by sectarianism and dominated
by SALAFIS in order to frighten minorities and those wishing to live in a
secular SYRIA.
Background
Information:
THE
ALAWITES AND ISRAEL
HISTORIC
FACTS ABOUT SYRIA
It is still unclear
whether the menacing anti-ALAWI chants were the result of meddling by the
intelligence services or the expression of sentiments held by a part of the SYRIAN
opposition. But it is indisputable that SYRIA has since been gripped by a civil
war between SUNNIS and ALAWIS, and that other minorities have become collateral
victims. SYRIA’S descent into intercommunal conflict has resembled the LEBANESE
civil war and, more recently, the ethno-sectarian fragmentation of IRAQ. SUNNI
fundamentalists who dominate the military opposition in SYRIA consider the ALAWIS
heretics unfit to live in DAR AL-ISLAM (the abode of ISLAM), let alone to rule
the country.
… ALAWIS were officially
recognized as MUSLIMS thanks to a fatwa issued by the mufti of PALESTINE, IMAM
HAJ AMIN AL-HUSSEINI, in July 1936. In 1973, due to the pressure exerted by SYRIAN
President HAFEZ AL-ASSAD on MUSA AL-SADR—the LEBANESE imam who founded the AMAL
movement—the ALAWIS were formally recognized as members of the SHI‘I community.
However, these two
“certificates of ISLAMIC-ness” did not convince some, including the MUSLIM
BROTHERHOOD, who killed many ALAWIS during the 1979-1982 uprising because of
their religion. More recently, in his sermons ON AL-WISAL, a SAUDI satellite
channel, the SALAFI SHAYKH ADNAN AL-AROUR has threatened to chop them up with a
meat grinder. …
CHANGES
IN MINORITY-MAJORITY POPULATION GROWTH
The relative decline of
the SYRIAN ALAWI population since the 1980s is due to an accelerated
demographic transition experienced by all minorities—ALAWI, CHRISTIAN, DRUZE,
and ISMAILI. In 2011, the non-SUNNI population of SYRIA shrank to about 20
percent, compared to 30 percent in 1980. This is due largely to women’s
improved access to education and their integration into professional life.
Fifty years ago, when ALAWIS experienced higher poverty and illiteracy rates,
their fertility rate was also high, but it fell sharply as access to education
and administrative jobs increased. Moreover, the ALAWIS, unlike the SUNNIS, are
not compelled to have a male descendant.
 |
| by Frabrice Balanche |
While the ALAWI fertility rate has
fallen, that of their SUNNI counterparts remains above three children per
woman, even in higher social classes. This demographic decline challenges the
power relationships within SYRIAN society. Over time, for example, the
proportion of ALAWIS in the army and the intelligence services decreased. At
the time the civil war began, SUNNI soldiers constituted a majority of the SYRIAN
Army, though ALAWIS retained a disproportionate share of the posts held by
senior officers. Since the beginning of the conflict, however, the composition
of the army has changed, with ALAWIS the majority at all echelons. This is why
it has been so difficult for the SYRIAN Army to defeat the insurgency and why
the regime has had to depend heavily on the support of HEZBOLLAH. Indeed, the ALAWI
community is unable to provide enough soldiers to fight against the numerous
rebels coming from abroad and from the large SUNNI population.
THE
CIVIL WAR’S IMPACT ON THE ALAWI COMMUNITY
The ALAWIS have
privileged access to state employment thanks to their deep integration into the
networks of SYRIAN power. Obvious discrimination in public sector hiring has
caused frustration among SUNNIS, but the fact that ALAWIS are generally more
assured of getting jobs does not mean that they have a higher standard of
living since government salaries are relatively low. HAFEZ AL-ASSAD used the ALAWI
Community to build his political system, but he did not seek to create
prosperity for ALAWIS because he knew that their loyalty to the regime was
mostly based on economic dependence.
An ALAWI middle class
emerged with the growth of the civil service, and over the past decade the
freezing of public sector recruitment has affected the ALAWI community less
than any other because ALAWIS are protected by a system of political patronage.
But the freeze has resulted in a high rate of unemployment among ALAWI youth in
the coastal region and has also had disastrous political consequences for BASHAR
AL-ASSAD, because more than 80 percent of the ALAWI community works for the
state. In fact, since coming to power, BASHAR has supported the ALAWI community
less than his father, calculating that it would feel obliged to support him
anyway in order to maintain its privileges. Instead, he made it a priority to
integrate the SUNNI and CHRISTIAN economic elites into his inner circle and share
with them the benefits of economic liberalization.
The ALAWI community has
not always given its full support to the regime. In the 1980s, the main Marxist
opposition movement, the Communist Action Party, attracted many young ALAWIS.
In the ongoing revolution, large protests against the regime have not mobilized
the ALAWI community, but some ALAWIS have joined demonstrations, and the
opposition includes many ALAWI figures (such as AREF DALILA, an academic who
spent 10 years in prison for his criticism of the government). However, in
March 2011, when the demonstrations began in BANIYAS, the majority of ALAWIS
did not support the SUNNI imams, who were asking for single-sex schools and the
communitarian re-balancing of public employment “confiscated by the ALAWIS.”
SYRIA
- THE MIRROR IMAGE OF THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR
Protests in the coastal
region did not lead to an escalation of violence as occurred in HOMS because
the SUNNI rebel enclaves were quickly contained by the army. The protests found
fertile ground in HOMS because ALAWIS represent a minority of the population in
the city and the surrounding countryside. In spring 2011, the tension in HOMS
between the communities was palpable. Taxis refused to drive passengers from SUNNI
to ALAWI areas, and clashes proliferated along the borders of these areas.
Kidnappings and assassinations on religious grounds have also been reported.
The ALAWi neighborhoods have been targeted by snipers and mortars from SUNNI
rebel areas. Many observers have compared the ongoing violence in Homs with the
disintegration of BEIRUT during the LEBANESE civil war.
Background
Information:
SYRIA’S
CIVIL WAR COULD LAST ABOUT AS LONG AS DID THE LEBANON WAR, NAMELY 15 YEARS
The conflict has forced
hundreds of thousands of people to migrate, and many ALAWI families have
returned to their villages in the coastal mountain range. Fleeing CHRISTIAN
families have settled in the seaside resorts of MASHTA AL-HELU and KAFROUN—near
TARTUS—though CHRISTIAN men continue to work in HOMS. The ALAWIS of DAMASCUS
have not left for the coast because most of them live far from the areas of
insurgency (such as DOUMA) and from the military camps in the suburbs. But if
the regime falls, the coastal region could become a haven for hundreds of
thousands of ALAWIS fleeing DAMASCUS and the purge of the army and the
administration that is likely to follow—not unlike what the SUNNIS in IRAQ experienced
after the fall of SADDAM HUSSEIN.
 |
| Military situation in Syria - May 2015, Fabriche Balanche |
“BALKANIZATION”
OF SYRIA
For centuries, the ALAWIS
lived as prisoners in the coastal mountains and came out only to serve as labor
for the landowners of LATAKIA, TRIPOLI, HOMS, and HAMA. The rise to power of HAFEZ
AL-ASSAD provided the community a chance for upward mobility. Even if the
economic and political context has changed since the days of IBN TAYMIYYA, the
re-ISLAMIZATION process within SYRIAN society raises concerns in the ALAWI
community, especially since the military opposition is dominated by ISIS and
the NUSRA FRONT.
If the BASHAR AL-ASSAD regime
is ousted, the ALAWIS may choose a territorial partition. They could rebuild
the former ALAWI state created between 1920 and 1936 by FRANCE in the coastal
region, though this time the external support would come from RUSSIA and IRAN.
…
Background
Information:
SECTARIAN
EQUATION
MIDDLE
EASTERN GEOPOLITICS
Fabriche Balanche
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